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COMPLICITY IN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
James G. Stewart * 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
These remarks, delivered on April 9, 2015 at the American Society of 
International Law’s Annual Conference, address the context of complicity 
discussions in public international law generally then their significance 
and scope in Business and Human Rights in particular. The Panel on 
which I delivered this talk was one of the first to discuss the topic of 
complicity across different fields, including International Criminal Law, 
the Alien Tort Statute, Business and Human Rights and the Public 
International Law of State Responsibility. In my comments, I offer five 
initial points contextualizing these discussions for the field of public 
international law writ large, then five more about their significance for 
Business and Human Rights as a discourse. In the first part I suggest that 
a robust discussion about complicity is vital if we are to lead decent 
ethical lives in a world that is at once increasingly interconnected and 
very dysfunctional. In the second, I problematize the use of international 
criminal law to supply the standards for complicity Business and Human 
Rights should employ. I suggest that negligence, not normally sufficient 
for criminal responsibility, should ground the standard for accomplice 
liability in the human rights context. Overall, I posit the idea of a tiered 
wall of complicity standards that are attuned to the conceptual pre-
commitments of the fields they operate in, not a monolithic system that 
takes international criminal law as the sole determinant of the concept.  
Nevertheless, even if a coherent system of complicity along these lines 
never emerges across international law as a whole, the mere fact that we 
are discussing the topic improves our chances of leading ethically decent 
lives in this our very imperfect world.  
  
                                                
* Dr James G. Stewart, Associate Professor, Allard School of Law, University of British 
Columbia. See www.jamesgstewart.com 
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Complicity in Business and Human Rights 
 
Thank you very much for the invitation to speak here today. It’s a great 
pleasure for me to be on a panel with a set of distinguished scholars whose 
work I admire and respect. 
 
I want to divide the time allotted to me into two parts. In the first part I 
want to offer five points that contextualize our discussions about 
complicity today, then in the second part, I'd like to turn to complicity in 
business and human rights in particular. 
 
Let me begin with my five contextual points in part one.  
 
First, complicity is a form of attribution. Forms of attribution, or modes of 
liability as they are also known, can be fairly arid, technical, technocratic 
things, that aren’t normally of much interest to international lawyers. I 
wanted to depict them in a way that highlights their great regulatory 
potential on an international plane. If you think of all of the harms in the 
world on the one hand, then all of the actors operating globally on the 
other, modes are attribution are those devices that exist between these two 
positions, reaching into the ocean of actors to tie them to particular 
atrocities. So, one can understand how these mediating concepts can have 
huge implications for global governance, even though they’re cast in fairly 
technocratic language. 
 
Second, complicity is just one mode of attribution, that makes up a far 
wider set that also have important implications for the actors I'm speaking 
about, namely businesses. I wanted to mention this at the outset because 
there is an occasional tendency in this discourse to conceive of corporate 
responsibility for international law violations as coterminous with 
complicity. That view is a mischaracterization of the full scope of 
potential liability and a part of my hope is that in discussing complicity 
now, we do not lose sight of the need for a much thicker understanding of 
the relationship between modes of attribution generally and business in 
this our increasingly globalized world. 
 
Third, I often use a metaphor to describe what's at stake with complicity 
globally and why I sense it holds such importance for the future of 
international law. Complicity goes to the heart of our attempts to live 
decently in a world that is characterized by, first, great interconnectedness 
born of globalization, and second, enormous dysfunction. Complicity is 
especially important as a legal and ethical concept that delineates how we 
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as individuals, businesses, and states should comport ourselves to lead 
decent lives in this very imperfect interconnected world. And because our 
points of connection are likely to intensify with the technological advance 
that drives globalization, complicity is likely to take on a new importance 
for international law moving forward. 
 
Fourth, I believe that just having these sorts of discussions about 
complicity is a net gain for the world. In her book On Violence, Hannah 
Arendt points out that the absence of a robust pacifist discourse in the 
world bodes ill for the ways in which we are likely to use force. By the 
same token, the absence of a robust discourse about complicity 
undermines our chances of living decent lives in the world as presently 
constituted. For that reason, discussions about complicity are to be 
welcomed, even and perhaps especially, where they involve differences of 
opinion, deep skepticism, and outright critique. 
 
Fifth, there is a real need for discussions among international lawyers 
about the ways in which complicity functions across the different sub-
fields of the discipline, as we have done I think for the first time in this 
panel today. What's interesting about the role of complicity across the 
Alien Tort Statute litigation, within international criminal justice, in 
business and human rights, as well as to some extent at least, in the public 
international law rules governing state responsibility is the extent to which 
international criminal law has been used as the benchmark that permeates 
all understandings. As I will mention in just a moment, it's not evident to 
me that international criminal law should be used in this way, or that 
complicity should mean the same thing across all the sub-components of 
public international law we are discussing today. 
 
So with these contextual points established, let me move to the second 
part of my presentation, where I discuss the role of complicity in business 
and human rights in particular.  
 
To begin, I want to spoil the plot a little by suggesting that complicity 
should be disaggregated across all of these different fields such that it 
means something much more permissive of accountability in business and 
human rights. Although I think this is an area of great importance for 
future research, my tentative thoughts at this stage are that international 
law should present a tiered wall of complicity that involves a hierarchy 
between the different types of standards that are attuned to the conceptual 
pre-commitments of the fields they operate in. I’ll concretize what I mean 
2015] COMPLICITY IN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 
   
by speaking to you about the history of complicity in business and human 
rights in particular 
 
In the year 2003, the UN Sub-Commission on the Human Rights adopted 
the Draft Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises with Regards to Human Rights. These draft 
norms did not meet with a great deal of approval thereafter, and in 2005 
Professor John Ruggie was appointed as Special Representative to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations to move forward with a quite 
different approach to these issues. As things transpired, Professor Ruggie 
abandoned the Draft Norms and began anew, in part because of 
differences of opinion about complicity. I’d like to offer a slightly 
divergent view about the way complicity should function in business and 
human rights that I think charts a third possible way. 
 
Let me start with the idea of a “sphere of influence.” Spheres of influence 
were a key component of the understanding of complicity announced in 
the Draft Norms. As originally conceived, the concept served two 
functions: first, it established the circumstances whereby corporations 
would be responsible for their contributions to downstream human rights 
violations others carried out with their help. A corporation wouldn't be 
responsible for all remote consequences of their actions, only those 
consequences that were in their sphere of influence. Second, this idea of 
spheres of influence delimited the relationship between corporations and 
states, with human rights law continuing to view the latter as its primary 
guarantors. 
 
In rejecting the Draft Norms because of their use of this notion of spheres 
of influence in its concept of complicity, Professor Ruggie rightly pointed 
out that spheres of influence had no legal pedigree. But when one looks to 
the legal concept that actually does this work in the law of complicity, i.e. 
the term that does have legal pedigree, it turns out that it is so complicated 
as to be unworkable as a guide for everyday businesses, and ultimately, 
that spheres of influence may be a fairly good proxy for what the real legal 
standard is. In reality, the question is whether businesses make substantial 
causal contributions to human rights violations, and that question is 
complicated by the fact that an overdetermined causal contribution, 
namely one where there are multiple sufficient causes for a harm, must be 
sufficient as a basis for responsibility. The intricacies of this relation have 
troubled philosophers since Hume.  
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Instead of getting into this complexity, spheres of influence would seem to 
be a fairly workable approximation of the core issues in the theory of 
causation. In this sense, the standard within the Draft Norms is arguably 
well suited to business and human rights as a practical enterprise. 
 
Relatedly, the mental element required for complicity in business and 
human rights was initially understood as being knowledge. This 
knowledge standard drew heavily on a particular reading of international 
criminal law, but again Ruggie rightly pointed out that there are numerous 
competing mental elements for complicity depending on where one looks. 
In many international courts and tribunals, knowledge is actually 
interpreted as recklessness. In civil law jurisdictions there is a concept of 
dolus eventualis, which is significantly more permissive of these sorts of 
cases than is knowledge. In some jurisdictions there are references to 
purpose as a mental element for complicity, and finally it's possible to 
think of the mental element as dynamic in the sense that it mirrors the 
mental elements required in the crime with which the accomplice will be 
prosecuted, which differ from crime to crime. In my view, this is the 
situation with the ICC Statute. 
 
What do we make, then, of this great diversity in mental element standards 
for complicity? Well, I just want to seize on the ICC standard to highlight 
how a transposition of international criminal law into international human 
rights law simply can't work as seamlessly as people seem to have 
supposed. If one accepts my interpretation that complicity in the ICC 
Statute involves (at least) two mental elements, purpose initially going to 
the form of assistance and then a second set of mental elements that derive 
from the crime with which the accomplice is charged, then this standard 
does not easily fit within international human rights law, which very 
seldom announces mental elements in the context of human rights norms 
businesses may become complicit in. In other words, the structural 
differences between criminal law and human rights law mean that 
complicity can’t just be copied and pasted between systems. 
 
In any event, which mental element for complicity should we choose in 
the business and human rights context? In my view, the answer should be 
none of the above. In my opinion the mental element for complicity in 
business and human rights should be negligence. While negligence would 
be too low a standard for criminal responsibility, it seems appropriate in 
the business and human rights context because it ties responsibility for 
human rights to a failure to perform the due diligence requirements that 
businesses already have to carry out for their shareholders. In other words, 
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people often ask me about the fact that a business should have known that 
they were engaging or furthering human rights violations, whereupon I tell 
them that should have known means negligence and that generally 
negligence is insufficient for criminal responsibility. But why should it not 
be appropriate as a gateway to compensation to those affected by 
corporate implication in human rights violations? 
 
Those, then, are my reflections on complicity in business and human 
rights and their place within a variegated, tiered system in public 
international law. As I say, one would think that international law would 
do well to get its house in order on issues of complicity given the relative 
shift from direct violation of international law precepts to the ways in 
which individuals, businesses, and states will increasingly be complicit in 
international law violations. Nevertheless, even if a coherent system of 
complicity never emerges across international law as a whole, the mere 
fact that we are discussing the topic improves our chances of leading 
ethically decent lives in this our very imperfect world.  
 
My kind thanks to the organizers for the invitation to speak today. 
